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ABSTRACT
In the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, the North American agricultural frontier moved into semi-arid regions of the Great Plains where farming was vulnerable to drought. Farmers who migrated to the region had to adapt their crops, techniques, and farm sizes to better fit the environment. But there was very incomplete information for making these adjustments, and ultimately they were insufficient: too many small, dry-land wheat farms were founded, only to be abandoned in the midst of drought. Two episodes of homestead settlement and collapse in western Kansas in 1893-94 and in eastern Montana in 1917-21 are examined. We go beyond the existing literature by explicitly detailing the weather information problem facing settlers and showing precisely why widespread homestead failure occurred. We present a Bayesian learning model to indicate how new climate information was incrementally incorporated to revise views of agricultural prospects. Primary data are used to show the lagged response of homesteaders to new drought information and to illustrate the differential impact of drought on small farms. Dryfarming doctrine arose as a solution to the problems faced by farmers in the region. Despite its optimistic claims, it was an imperfect response to drought. Indeed, some dryfarming practices increased the likelihood of homestead failure. Stegner (1954, 399) "Dame Nature of the West holds out most alluring charms, and those who woo and win her smile reap a reward beyond compare. The one thing most needed is correct and accurate information." Buffin (1909, 16) "That dry-farming is a system of agricultural practice which requires the application of high skill and intelligence is admitted; that it is precarious is denied. The year of drought is ordinarily the year in which the man failed to do properly his share of the work." Widtsoe (1911, 412) I. Introduction.
"No one need be in doubt about the sharp change in climate that occurs somewhere between the 96 th and 100 th meridians. It can be felt on the lips and skin, observed in the characteristic plant and animal life, seen in the clarity and/or dustiness of the atmosphere, determined by measurements of rainfall and evaporation, tested by attempts at unaided agriculture. Practically every western traveler in the early years remarked the facts of aridity, though not all used the word 'desert'.."
In the midst of the tragic drought of the 1930s that was driving farmers from the land and exposing dry soil to wind erosion and the Dust Bowl, the Roosevelt Administration established the Great Plains Committee to assess prospects for the region. The Committee was somber in its assessment (1936, 1, 3, 7, 40, 42) . It concluded that existing conditions "had merely accentuated a situation which had been long developing." Homestead farms were too small to be viable and correspondingly, were too intensively cultivated and too focused on wheat. The Committee recommended unprecedented measures to reduce the number of farms and farmers through resettlement programs and to increase farm size and diversification through consolidation and a shift to livestock and other crops. Past land settlement policies were castigated for encouraging excessive migration to the Great Plains.
Although the drought of the 1930s was one of the most severe and widespread of the 20 th century, earlier droughts had also brought homestead "busts" to different parts of the Great Plains. Through each episode, the number of farms gradually declined and farm sizes gradually increased. These clusters of farm failures were unusual in the American agricultural frontier experience, and the obvious question is why small dry-land homesteads were located on the Great Plains in the first place. 1 In this paper, we examine the weather information problem confronting initial homesteaders. We argue that the lack of accurate information led the Great Plains to be settled too densely in farms that were later found to be too small, undercapitalized and insufficiently diversified to be sustainable. The subsequent waves of homestead busts that swept the region during severe droughts were part of the adjustment toward agricultural techniques, crops, and farm sizes more appropriate for a semi-arid region.
The problems of agriculture on the Great Plains have been examined previously by economic historians, especially with regard to the Canadian prairies. Norrie (1975 Norrie ( , 1977 Norrie ( , 1980 , Lewis (1981) , Borins (1982) , and Ward (1994) analyze the timing of the Canadian wheat boom between 1880 and 1914 and describe how climate and technology affected early prairie farming. The importance of summer fallow and rapid -growing wheat varieties for extending the range of settlement is discussed. Homesteading on the Great Plains in the early twentieth century also has been examined by historians, such as Gates (1977) for the U.S. and Jones (1986 Jones ( , 1987 for Canada. Farm failure in western Kansas and in eastern Montana is 3 addressed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (1938) , Howard (1959, 189-6) , Fite (1966) , and White (1991, . Finally, the broader issue of adaptation to semi-arid conditions is the central theme of the major historical work on the Great Plains by Webb (1931) , Hargreaves (1957) , and Malin (1944 Malin ( ,1947 .
Our contribution is to describe more precisely the weather information problem facing all parties in the settlement of the Great Plains--homesteaders, investigators for the U.S. Department of Agriculture and state agricultural experiment stations, local and state government officials, land developers, and railroad officers. We analyze primary data to determine the knowledge that existed regarding rainfall patterns and appropriate agricultural methods. We argue that during homestead settlement there was neither an analytical framework nor sufficient data for predicting fluctuations in precipitation or for interpreting their agricultural consequences. Knowledge of the climate was primitive and the underlying mechanisms triggering droughts were not understood. We present a Bayesian learning model to show how new climate information was incrementally incorporated to modify views of the region and its opportunities for successful agriculture. 2 The resulting adaption process was not smooth or easy. Primary data are used to show the lagged response of homesteaders new drought information and to illustrate the differential impact of drought on small farms. The Great Plains could be either wet and lush or dry and barren, with no particular pattern. These conditions presented unusual learning and adaptation challenges for all parties on the frontier in ways not fully appreciated in the existing literature.
For example, consider assessments of two climate theories that were popular during different stages of migration to the Great Plans: "Rain follows the plow" and dryfarming doctrine. These theories were faulted as implausible, but if they are placed into the context of the limited climate and agricultural information at hand, they are understandable as responses to observed conditions. On the earlier Kansas frontier, homesteaders relied upon predictions of climate change and increased rainfall due to cultivation. Webb (1931, 375-82) labeled the notion that precipitation would rise with settlement as a "false hypothesis" that grew out of the intense desire of farmers for more rain. But rainfall initially was high as agriculture moved into the region, and observers lacked any compelling reason to deny its possible link to settlement. On the later Montana frontier, settlers were reassured by dryfarming doctrine that proper cultivation could save sufficient moisture to endure dry periods. Throughout her study, Hargreaves 4 criticizes the dryfarming movement for making excessive claims: "that it had been promoted by a highly organized propaganda is the most obvious conclusion; that it has been an effort largely without guidance in the public interest becomes equally apparent" (1957, 23) . 3 As we show, however, dryfarming doctrine was tested during periods of ( ex post ) abnormal rainfall, and it too seemed a remedy for the semi-arid conditions of region.
Both theories emerged at a time when the practical science of cultivation seemed to offer the means for bending nature to meet human needs. The drought of 1917-21 in Montana finally dashed these notions.
We examine changes in dryfarming doctrine and assess which tenets held up and which ones had to be significantly modified or jettisoned. We also show that the recommended 160 to 320-acre homesteads were the farms most likely to fail during drought.
II. Homesteading on the Great Plains and the Information Pro blem Facing Settlers Regarding the
Weather.
Between 1863 and 1880, the northern U.S. agricultural frontier moved across the Midwest from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois through Iowa, Wisconsin and Minnesota to the eastern parts of Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas. 4 In following the frontier, migrants encountered similar climatic and growing conditions. This situation allowed settlers to use familiar cultivation techniques, crops, and farm sizes as in their places of origin. When migrants crossed the 100 th meridian into this region (Figure 1 ), they encountered climatic conditions that were quite different from what they had experienced in the East or in Europe. It was dry.
Early explorers had labeled it the Great American Desert. 7 5 Figure 2 illustrates climatic conditions facing settlers. It shows mean precipitation levels for three Midwestern states that were origins for many homesteaders-Minnesota, Illinois, and Ohio, as well as for western Kansas, and eastern Montana, from 1895 through 1947, a period for which we have comparable regional data. 8 The figure shows the rainfall disparities that confronted homesteaders at their frontier destination. Notice that precipitation was always higher in the Midwest, and even when it fell, it remained above that found in western Kansas and eastern Montana. In the Midwest, during a dry period, rainfall generally was sufficient for crops at lower yields. But in western Kansas and eastern Montana agriculture was always on the margin. When rainfall was at or above the mean, yields would be plentiful, but when rainfall was below the mean, yields and agricultural income would fall. Table 1 reports the mean precipitation levels for the three regions, the coefficient of variation, and the correlation coefficients between the regions. Not only did western Kansas and eastern Montana have lower average precipitation than in the Midwest, but the coefficient of variation measures show that rainfall was more variable, making weather prediction more difficult in those states. Further, the correlation coefficients indicate that the weather experience a farmer might have had in Ohio provided little useful information for predicting rainfall patterns in either frontier area. Table 1 Our definition of a severe drought is rainfall one standard deviation below the mean. An annual rainfall distribution calculated for the state of Montana over a 88-year period, 1895 to 1982, reveals that severe droughts, with precipitation of 13 inches or less, occurred 16 percent of the time. Precipitation above the mean, with precipitation between 16 and 22 inches, was found during 40 percent of the period. Annual rainfall of 20 inches or less was the threshold used by Webb (1931, 17) to define the Great Plains. A similar distribution calculated for the Midwest, however, shows that even during severe droughts, annual rainfall never fell below 25 inches. In the Great Plains, then, low mean precipitation, coupled with high variability, presented a new threat for agriculture, and drought was to take a toll. 9 The weather information problem facing migrants was especially acute because of the climatic conditions on the Great Plains, the lack of systematic data to describe them, and the absence of an analytical 6 model for interpreting available information. The Great Plains are a climatic transition zone where most North American droughts occur. 10 During periods of high precipitation, the area takes on the characteristics of the East and is attractive for the kinds of agriculture that take place there.
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When droughts occur, however, those farming practices are placed at risk since rainfall levels are far too low to sustain crops that require more moisture.
Drought is a meteorological phenomenon, an extended period of below normal levels of precipitation.
It is due to an aberration in atmospheric circulation, but the precise triggering mechanisms even today are not well identified or very accurately predicted. 12 In the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries studying droughts was made more difficult because of very limited access to the mid and upper atmosphere, which housed the jet stream and other key meteorological forces affecting precipitation. Further, there was no established framework for analyzing the data that were collected. 13 The Weather Bureau's Bulletin D, issued in 1897 outlined the primitive state of knowledge about precipitation and admitted that there were few observed patterns regarding droughts (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Weather Bureau,1897, 18, 24) . Only sparse rainfall data for the Great Plains were available for analysis by prospective homesteaders. Although the Weather Bureau collected some precipitation data for the region, the data generally were intermittent and incomplete for most of the 19 th century. Until the Great Plains were settled, droughts were not of overriding concern to migrants. In the Midwest dry months could reduce yields and agricultural income in affected areas, but they usually did not mean complete crop failures. Temperatures were followed more closely because frosts were important in determining growing seasons. The Army Signal Corp only began to systematically collect temperature and precipitation data from weather stations and voluntary reporters in 1870 with creation of the U.S. Weather Bureau. 15 A Division of Agricultural Meteorology to analyze weather patterns was not established until1916. 16 With a very imperfect understanding of the region's climate, "folk" theories emerged regarding the weather of the Great Plains. "Rain follows the plow" was the most influential early model for explaining the 7 weather of the region (Smith, 1947, 169-93; Malin, 1953, 211) . The theory argued that rainfall was endogenous to human activity. The frequent movement of transcontinental trains was thought to change the flow of moisture, increasing precipitation in the plains. Planting trees also was hypothesized to make the air more humid with the release of oxygen and water vapor and hence, more likely to support rainfall. But the most critical factor was cultivation, whereby the hard prairie soil which previously caused water to run off, was broken down to become more absorptive and a subsequent source of moisture for evaporation and following the cycle, for rainfall.
After the Kansas drought of 1893-94, the idea that cultivation would permanently affect precipitation began to be dismissed. Some Weather Bureau officials concluded that the climate did not change perceptively due to human activity. Irrigatio n proponent, F. Newell (1896, 172) argued that "farmers have deluded themselves with the belief that with the breaking the soil...and bringing civilization, the climate was becoming more favorable to their operations." E.C. Chilcott, Chief of the Office of Dry Land Agriculture in the Department of Agriculture and others in the USDA rejected the argument that the climate was changing (Chilcott, 1908, 451; Sullivan, 1909, 289-90) . There was, however, no alternative explanation for precipitation fluctuations, such as the relatively high levels of rainfall enjoyed in western Kansas in the early 1880s and in eastern Montana between 1906 and 1916. Even as late as the1930s, a leading researcher of climate in the region, Warren Thornthwaite (1936, 219) , concluded that there was no simple rainfall pattern that lent itself for effective drought predictions on the Great Plains.
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III. The Kansas Homestead Bust: the First Major Homestead Failure on the High Plains.
Homestead failure in Kansas illustrates how severe drought modified initial views of farming prospects on the central Great Plains. Eastern Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas were settled beginning in the late 1850s and early 1860s, largely by emigrants from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Rainfall and soil conditions were relatively similar to what they had experienced before and the settlers "felt at home" (Fite, 1966, 13) . Farmers used the same farming techniques and grew crops of corn and small grains. The agricultural frontier continued to move westward across Kansas through the early 1890s. A major drought, 8 however, led to an exodus of homesteaders as their crops and farms failed. This was the first major homestead "bust" on the Great Plains. Although the USDA published bulletins on farming in the Great Plains, it does not appear to have actively disseminated the publications to migrants, nor did it or any other agency strongly warn of droughts. 22 Indeed, most organizations were stressing a different factor, dryfarming doctrine, that promised to limit the impact of any future drought on agricultural prospects in the region. Dryfarming doctrine, or scientific soil culture, gained prominence after 1906. The most influential communicator of dryfarming doctrine was Hardy Webster Campbell who published a series of monographs (1902, 1907, 1914, 1916) . Other major dryfarming proponents had credible academic credentials and Their recommendations to farmers were presented in a scientific manner, with discussion of the experimental techniques used, designation of control plots, use of precise measurement in data collection, and accompanied with practical testimonials. 25 Their prescriptions for arid regions were repeated in agricultural experiment station bulletins and circulars, state and local government publications, proceedings of Dry Farming Congresses, and railroad immigration pamphlets. Further, dry farming doctrine was examined in USDA bulletins, and an Office of Dry Land Agriculture was created in 1905. Dryfarming doctrine offered a remedy for drought. With proper cultivation, soil moisture could be saved and yields could be smoothed.
Dryfarming doctrine made failure a choice variable. 26 Farmers who followed its precepts could expect to succeed during perio ds of short rainfall, whereas those who did not could expect to fail.
Dryfarming doctrine reflected the Progressive Era's belief in the practical use of science to advance human welfare: "dry-farming was moving onward to conquer the waste places of the earth." 27 Since its 10 techniques were so labor intensive, but promised such high yields, dryfarming also encouraged formation of small family farms.
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This was important because the emergence of dryfarming principles coincided with political conflict over the size of homesteads to be allowed on federal lands. In 1878, John Wesley Powell had proposed allocations of 2,560 acres in semi-arid regions. Such large allocations were controversial because they threatened to reduce the total number of settlers who could obtain land on the frontier. 29 Those who promoted Campbell's dryfarming techniques strongly supported the maintenance of the small-farm homestead. Dryfarming's promises may have influenced the political debate because only minimal adjustments were made to federal land laws in 1909 and 1912 to allow for 320 rather than 160 acres and to reduce the residency requirement from 5 to 3 years. The question subsequently encountered was whether such small farms of 160 or 320 acres could be viable during serious drought.
The key element of dryfarming doctrine was the use of the soil to store water, sometimes four to ten feet under ground. The stored water was hypothesized to percolate upward via capillary action toward the surface to nourish plant roots (Campbell, 1902, 6) . Water was to be captured through persistent cultivation, deep fall and spring plowing to capture moisture, surface mulching with a harrow after every rain to create a 2 ½ to 3 inch mulch to retard evaporation, subsurface soil packing to promote percolation, and summer fallow and tillage on alternating years to build up moisture and nutrients. 30 The subsurface packer and other specialized implements were recommended by dryfarming advocates. 31 Too much evaporation, rather than too little rainfall was asserted to be the critical problem in semi-arid regions (Campbell, 1902, 42) . Close attention to the principles promised mastery over the vagaries of nature: "the farmer will always have a crop: in the wet years his crop will be large; in the driest year it will be sufficient to sustain him" (Widtsoe, 1911, 402) .
Dryfarming experiments were conducted at a time when there were no serious droughts, and its claims were not really put to test until1917. Lacking the perspective of long-term precipitation and farming data, its advocates, however, did not appreciate how dependent their conclusions were on the unusual rainfall of the period.
Dryfarming's possibilities were so attractive that it was emphasized by virtually every organization supplying information to homesteaders on the Great Plains after the turn of the century. Dryfarming doctrine molded how settlers formed expectations for agricultural success on the Great Plains and how they interpreted new evidence regarding changes in rainfall.
A chief source of information was the agricultural experiment station. The Montana Agricultural Experiment Station organized Farmers' Institutes to bring together farmers and experiment station personnel.
The Farmers' Institute assured prospective homesteaders that even in eastern Montana where annual rainfall was about 13 inches, irrigation was "not necessary" in many places and that good crops could be grown even during dry periods by adhering to dryfarming doctrine (Montana Farmers' Institutes (1903, 201-3) .
Besides Farmers' Institutes, demonstration farms were set up to showcase new crops, equipment, and cultivation practices, and by1910,13 dry farm substations had been set up to conduct dryfarming tests in eastern Montana. 32 Publications of the Experiment Stations in Montana, North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Wyoming, and Colorado provided specific information to settlers about precipitation levels in various areas, crop types to plant, new varieties under consideration, cultivation and tillage techniques, the best timing for cultivation and planting in each region, results of crop rotation experiments, expected yields and costs, returns from use of summer fallow, and necessary farm equipment. 33 The publications were optimistic in their prescriptions for the success of small dry-land homesteads, and they often repeated or closely followed the principles advocated by Campbell, Widtsoe, Buffin, and others. 34 In this literature, rainfall levels were of secondary importance because of the emphasis on moisture conservation through the use of dryfarming doctrine.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture also disseminated dryfarming information, but was more hesitant than were the experiment stations in drawing strong conclusions about its success throughout the Great Plains. 35 Department personnel argued that regional differences had to be considered before making broad recommendations, and they criticized Hardy Webster Campbell's assertion that dryfarming techniques could be applied everywhere to improve yields. Indeed, E.C. Chilcott, head of the Office of Dry Land Agriculture was Campbell's chief critic (Chilcott, 1908 (Chilcott, , 1910 (Chilcott, , 1912 . 36 Even so, the Department did not strongly counter the assertions of dryfarming doctrine, and other USDA publications described the results of dry farm experiments and recommended cultivation to enhance water storage in a manner consistent with Campbell's arguments. 37 Another source of information were Dry Farming Congresses. At least ten Dry Farming Congresses were held between1907 and 1916 in cities throughout the Great Plains "to discuss and compare methods by which the great area of arid land can be profitably utilized under thorough tillage by which the natural rainfall can be conserved" (Dry Farming Congress, Board of Control, 1909, 3-4) . 38 The meetings were popular. 500 delegates attended the third Congress in Cheyenne, February 23-25, 1909, and in 1912, the Dry Farming Congress was alleged to have 15,000 members. 39 The assemblies were addressed by experiment station personnel, leading dryfarming proponents like Hardy Webster Campbell, and local politicians, such as the Governors of Colorado, Wyoming, and Montana.
Prospective homesteaders on the upper Great Plains also received publications on farming prospects from state agencies, such as the Montana Bureau of Agriculture, Labor and Industry (1900-1912) , later the Department of Agriculture and Publicity (1914-1924) and from local communities, land developers, and professional homestead locators. These parties were confident of the future of agriculture in the region. They described the benefits of dryfarming and provided other practical information on precipitation, county population, land values, and spur railroad lines.
The railroads were yet another source of weather and agricultural information for migrants. They have been criticized form misleading settlers with extravagant claims about homestead prospects (Hargreaves, 1957, 224; Howard, 1959, 167-82; Toole, 1959, 233-5) . It is not accurate, however, to describe the railroads' promotion of homesteading as mere propaganda. Railroads could not have been indifferent to the outcome of migration. Agricultural development was necessary to promote the settlement and economic growth of the region. Its failure would reduce the attractiveness of the area to migrants and hence, the value of railroad investment. Trains, and particularly, tracks and yards were site-specific capital investments with few alternative uses. The railroads had a stake in the permanent, not temporary, success of the region, and they had no better information about the weather or farming opportunities than did the experiment stations or USDA. Dryfarming doctrine offered a solution to the problem of settling their lands, and they invested in 13 experiments, demonstration farms and trains, and publicized its advantages. 40 "Big business" too could make faulty decisions.
Following the experience of the drought of 1917-21, however, dryfarming doctrine was significantly modified by all parties. We have reviewed publications of the experiment stations, the USDA, the railroads, and the Montana state government to assess which concepts were dropped or changed based on new drought information. Dryfarming doctrine's emphasis on moisture conservation was retained, but the strong conclusions that it would maintain yields even under the driest conditions were eliminated. Dryfarming no longer was viewed as a panacea, but rather as a means of improving yields during periods of reasonable rainfall (McKee, 1922, 37; Wilson, 1923, 73) . Many older arguments were dismissed altogether. Deep water storage and capillary action were found to have no empirical basis. Deep plowing and soil packing, once emphasized, were not recommended. Instead, more limited cultivation was advised to avoid wind erosion and excessive evaporation (McKee, 1922, 3; Wilson, 1923, 41-48; 74-81) . Summer fallow, strip cropping, and inter-tillage of crops became the primary methods for conserving soil moisture and raising yields (Seamans, 1921, 4-6; Wilson, 1923, 25, 36, 41-8, 67-9, 81) . Previously favored, small homesteads were not advocated, except for irrigated farms. Where possible, irrigation was suggested as a means of protecting yields and supporting crops like alfalfa (Montana Department of Agriculture and Publicity, 1919, 35; 1920, 20, 35; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, Northern Pacific, and Great Northern Railroads, 1924, 51; Morgan and Seamans, 1920, 18) . Irrigation's reach in this dry area of few streams, however, was recognized as limited. Farmers were urged to diversify to other crops beyond wheat and to livestock. Melons and potatoes were no longer touted as suited for the region, and drought-resistant wheat varieties, like Kubanka and Marquis spring wheat and Kharkov winter wheat were given more attention (Morgan and Seamans, 1920, 9, 13; Seamans, 1921, 21; Wilson, 1923, 41-48; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, Northern Pacific, and Great Northern Railroads, 1924, 31) . These were major adjustments in prescriptions for successful agriculture in a semi-arid region, and they had important implications for farming in the upper Great Plains.
Before examining those effects, we turn to the record of initial homestead settlement. We have been unable to locate farm-level data during the peak settlement period, 1906-1916, to analyze what a homesteader might have expected to earn from migrating to the region prior to the drought.
We have, however, found a sample of farms surveyed in 1921-2 by the Montana Agricultural Experiment Station. The survey collected data on farm size, crop acres, production, sales, and expenses for 27 homesteads of 320 acres or less and 97 farms larger than 320 acres in the eastern Montana counties of Hill, Toole, Pondera, Cascade, Carter, Teton, Liberty, and Chouteau. 46 We use these survey data to approximate what the average homestead farm would have earned from wheat production in 1916, the year before the drought.
Using mean farm size and mean wheat acres from the survey, the1916 Montana average wheat yield of 19.3 bushels per acre and wheat prices of $1.43, and converting1921 mean current and total expense estimates from the survey to1916 values, we estimated gross and net wheat income for the average homestead. The exercise is shown in Ta ble 2.
As indicated, the mean gross wheat income for a homestead was $2,650; wheat income net of current expenses was $2,365; and net of total expenses was $2,225. 47 Although these are only suggestive figures, they compare very favorably with average U.S. per farm gross income of $2,104 in 1920 or mean total farm receipts for the western U.S. of $2,322 in 1922. 48 The sample data indicate why homesteading in the upper Great Plains was such an attractive prospect in the early part of the twentieth century, given the very high wheat yields that were possible from untapped soil. Table 2 To further examine the motivating factors for homesteading we estimated two equations for the period 1895 to 1925 for Montana:
(1) Yields t = c 1 + c 2 Land Quality t + c 3 Rain t, t-1 + e, where land quality is represented by available surveyed federal land. Of the total federal land available for claiming, there were surveyed and unsurveyed lands. Absent a time-series measure of soil quality, we assume that General Land Office surveyors would have surveyed the best or most productive lands first because those would have been most desirable to homesteaders. 49 As homesteaders claimed the best lands, the supply of available high quality surveyed land declined. We included current and previous year's rainfall to test for their effects on yields. Table 3   Table 3 provides the results of the OLS estimation. Wheat yields were strongly influenced by land quality as proxied and current rainfall. The previous year's rain had a positive, but statistically insignificant impact on yields. These findings underscore the importance of current precipitation on plant growth in a semi-arid region.
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For annual original homesteads filed, changes in federal land law that reduced the occupancy requirement and doubled the amount of land that could be claimed to 320 acres and lagged wheat yields, reflecting information on expected returns from wheat farming have the expected positive signs and are significant at approximately the 5 percent level. Surveyed federal lands available for homesteading and real wheat prices, both current and previous year's, also encouraged new entries although at lower levels of significance.
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Migrants, then, were attracted to the region by the availability of government land, which after 1909 could be claimed more easily, by knowledge of previous high wheat yields, and the price of wheat.
VI. Limited Climate Information, Dryfarming Doctrine and Learning: Drought and Homestead
Failure.
Because settlers were moving into a very different region from what they had experienced, they would not know the "true" conditions for agricultural prospects at the time of the migration or farming decision. When making their decisions, they would have to decide how to weigh observed conditions, relative to their prior beliefs about the area. A Bayesian decision process would involve updating prior assessments whenever new information about precipitation, yields, and prices appeared, leading homesteaders to form new posterior judgements about the true state of agricultural opportunities in the upper Great Plains. Hence, settlers would begin with limited information about farming opportunities obtained from previous homesteaders or publications from railroads, state and local governments or other sources. After migration, they would annually update their prior opinions based on their actual experiences, leading to a more complete judgement about farming opportunities.
This Bayesian process has been described as adaptive learning (Cyert and DeGroot, 1989) . If the possibility of serious drought in the region had been appreciated and the linkage between precipitation and farm production well understood, farmers would have reacted differently than they did. Observations of very dry weather when the drought began in 1917 would have led homesteaders to modify their prior opinions, formed during years of relatively high rainfall, and to adjust farming practices-delaying or changing migration plans for prospective migrants and reducing planting by existing farmers. Because of their size, larger farms would have been preferred because they could produce more, devote additional land to moisture-conserving fallow, and diversify into other crops and livestock that could better withstand drought.
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But, the climate was not understood and appropriate farm practices and sizes had not been determined. Dryfarming doctrine argued that annual rainfall was not essential and that small farms could be successful under adverse conditions. This limited and ultimately faulty information was used in the assessment of weather conditions and their implications for agriculture.
Given a high degree of uncertainty, homesteaders relied upon heuristics that heavily weighted past information, gained from the experiment station and from their own experience, in making judgements about farming prospects when they received new rainfall information. 53 We argue that the previous wet period and the strong claims of dryfarming doctrine led homesteaders to discount observations of dry weather and to place more weight on past opinions about the ability of the small farms to withstand droughts. Discounting drought prospects would lead to continued migration and farming, even in the face of currently observed unattractive returns. This decision rule would be reinforced if past dry years had been followed by a rebound 18 in yields because that experience would have validated the claims of dryfarming doctrine. If a dry year, however, were followed by longer periods of drought and low yields, then eventually prior beliefs would be adjusted toward a more pessimistic view of homesteading opportunities. Accordingly, a migration and farming decision rule strongly influenced by the past assertions of dryfarming doctrine would result in a lagged response to a serious drought.
As Figure 5 shows, the drought of 1917-1921 stands out both for the severity of the precipitation shortfall and for its length. It was certainly an unusual event for the recently-arrived population. For five years, precipitation remained below average, and in 1917 and 1919 rainfall was more than one standard deviation below the mean. Nothing like this had been experienced in Montana since 1895, the period in which historical data were available for consideration by homesteaders. As shown in the figure, there were two short-term droughts in 1904 and 1910. These had been accommodated with little hardship, and this experience gave confidence that new dryfarming techniques could successfully store enough water in the soil to carry a small farmer through a drought year.
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Although we do not have individual homestead data to directly test the prediction of a lagged response to drought due to the claims of dryfarming doctrine, we have state and county-level data that are instructive. The data in Figure 4 show that original homestead entries in Montana continued at their high level through1922. 53,366 additional new homestead entries were filed between 1917 and 1925, with most between 1917 and 1922. 15,197 original homestead entries were made in 1917 (more than in 1916), and they gradually declined, but even 1920 and 1921, the last two years of the drought, 13,235 homestead claims were entered. 55 The number of farms in Montana grew by 7,700 between 1916 and 1920 before declining gradually by 1925. 56 At the county level, Table 4 shows the number of farms by two size categories, 320-acre homesteads and farms 641 acres and larger, in Prairie County, in eastern Montana between 1916 and 1919. As indicated in the table, the number of 320-acre homesteads continued to grow and the homestead share of total farms remained stable from 1916, the year before the drought, through 1919. There is no evidence of a shift to larger farms over 640 acres that subsequently were viewed in exp eriment station publications as most likely to be sustainable in a semi-arid climate.
Rising wheat prices between 1915 and 1920 provided motivation for settlement because they offered some offset for the 90 percent decline in wheat yields between 1915 and 1919. But had climate knowledge been more complete, the response to higher wheat prices would have been more through expanded farm sizes in the face of drought rather than through settlement in small farms by additional homesteaders. Table 4 Experiment station personnel also failed to anticipate the severity of the drought and urged continued migration to the region. The drought would continue and become even more severe, yet Atkinson examined available precipitation data from 1898 through 1916 and concluded that there was "a tendency for two dry years, but in very few cases for three dry years in succession." 58 By 1919 the unusual duration of the drought was finally acknowledged by experiment station personnel, and for the first time, there was doubt about the ability of dryfarming doctrine to guarantee at least a moderately successful crop. In a further shift, in 1920 the experiment station claimed that drought could be expected "rather frequently (Montana Agricultural Experiment Station, 1920, 8; 1921, 7; 1922, 57) .
Beginning in 1920, after three years of drought and after average wheat yields had dropped to 2.7 bushels per acre in 1919, down from 26.5 bushels in 1915, prior beliefs about the viability of small homesteads finally were being revised downward. Experiment station and railroad officials, as well as current and prospective homesteaders, began to modify their views of the region. Homestead abandonment began. Between 1919 and 1925, some 60,000 homesteaders are claimed to have left their farms, with over 11,000 farms failing (one out of five) and approximately 2,000,000 acres of land going out of production. 59 
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Montana became less attractive to migrants. As shown in Figure 4 , the number of new homesteads declined in 1921 and 1922 and fell sharply in 1923.
The impact of the drought on farm incomes was dramatic, and it undercut the viability of small homesteads in particular. The effect of drought on large and small farms is illustrated by the survey data in Table 2 . In rows 2 and 3, we show gross and net wheat income in 1919 at the peak of the drought for the average small and large farm. The figures are calculated using the wheat acreage data from the 1921 survey, 1919 statewide mean yields of 2.7 bushels per acre, and the 1919 mean wheat price of $2.16 per bushel. The experiment station and USDA literature after 1920 is uniformly critical of small homesteads as not being viable for agriculture in the semi-arid upper Great Plains. Experiment Station Director Linfield claimed that the earlier distribution of lands via the homestead acts had been a mistake and that much larger farms, "two to four times the area of the land named in the National Homestead Acts" were necessary for successful farming in dry areas (Montana Agricultural Experiment Station, 1924, 8; 1926, 6) . 61 Smaller farms not only produced less, but they also had higher costs per bushel. Using the survey data, mean 1919 current expenses per bushel were $1.74 and $1.29 for small and large farms, respectively, a difference of over a third or $.45 per bushel. 62 Although variation in land quality and human capital may have influenced the ability of some farms t o survive the drought, we do not have data for successful and unsuccessful farms to examine their relative contribution. The available evidence, however, suggests that they likely played a secondary role in the differential failure of small farms. While the earliest homesteaders had access to better lands than did those 21 who arrived later, land quality was generally high throughout the region (Morgan and Seamans, 1920, 2; Wilson, 1923, 8-11) . Further, most homesteaders appear to have had farming experience. 63 Farm size was emphasized because when yields fell due to drought, farms of 320 acres or less could not produce enough to cover costs and sustain a family (Wilson, 1923, 94; Eckert and Maughan, 1939, 23) . 64 There were at least some economies of scale in grain production, and 360 acres was below the minimum efficient size for dryland agriculture (Wilson, 1923, 108-9; Eckert and Maughan, 1939, 15-23) . Additionally, small farmers may have been less likely to practice summer fallowing, which was strongly recommended for retaining moisture and maintaining yields. 65 With limited acreage, small farms may not have been able to afford to leave much land in fallow. Finally, small farms did not diversify into other crops and especially into livestock, as was suggested as another means of better withstanding drought (Wilson, 1923, 41, 108-9; Oakley and Westover, 1924, 50) . 66 Data assembled by the experiment station to analyze foreclosures on farm loans also shows the vulnerability of small homesteads to the drop in yields that occurred with the drought. The data are described in Table 5 . Table 5 Of the 381 loans examined, 107 were to homesteaded farms with an average size of 291 acres.
Most foreclosed loans were made between 1917 and 1921. 70 percent of the loans to homesteaded farms were foreclosed, by far the largest percentage of all farm categories. By comparison, the 127 farms acquired through purchase from non-relatives with an average size of 544 acres had foreclosure rates of 28 percent, the next highest category. All larger farms had lower foreclosure rates. They were less likely to default on loans during drought because they had more production to draw from and other products beyond wheat to sell. 67 The entire wheat-growing region of the Midwest was hurt by the fall in wheat prices in 1921, but the drought in the upper Great Plains exacerbated the problem. Across the region, farm failure was most common among the small homesteads of eastern Montana (Rich, 1923; Renne, 1938, 20; 1939, 17) .
Survey data from later in the 1920s and early 1930s reinforce the conclusion that small homesteads were not viable on the Great Plains. study of 503 "unsuccessful" farms in eastern 22 Montana, using data for [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] , found that they were undiversified and small, two-thirds were below 360 acres, when at least 700 to 800 acres were deemed necessary for minimum cost production. 68 Cochrane's (1938) examination of 314 farms, using data for 1934-36, found that the most productive farms (measured by net income) were twice the size of the average farm, at approximately 1,100 acres, focused on wheat cultivation with diversification into livestock production, did not invest appreciably more in buildings, but used more machinery, and were more likely to practice summer fallow than were their less productive counterparts.
VII. Conclusion.
In the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries the North American agricultural frontier moved for the first time into semi-arid regions where farming was vulnerable to drought. Farmers who migrated to the Great Plains had to adapt their crops, techniques, and farm sizes to better fit the environment. But there was very incomplete information for making these adjustments. The use of decision rules that were heavily influenced by first, the optimistic notion that the climate was changing, and then by the strong claims of dryfarming doctrine led too many to migrate to the region and settle on too many small dry land wheat farms. Our sample homestead data indicate that so long as rainfall and yields remained high, early homesteads were viable, providing farm incomes comparable to what could be earned elsewhere. But when rainfall sharply declined, small farms were especially vulnerable. Many were abandoned subsequently in the midst of drought.
Two waves of major homestead failures took place, first in the central Great Plains of western Kansas and Nebraska and eastern Colorado and then, almost 25 years later in the northern Great Plains of eastern Montana and the western Dakotas. These homestead failures and corresponding farm consolidation were part of a necessary transition process toward larger, more viable farms in the Great Plains. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to estimate the costs of this transition, they surely included the lost opportunity income of homesteaders during the five-year drought period, redundant farm buildings, intensive cultivation that subsequently contributed to wind erosion and the Dust Bowl of the 1930s, excessive county infrastructure that was designed for larger populations, and disruption to the banking system by wide-spread mortgage defaults by small farmers and corresponding bank failures.
The transactions costs, however, were probably unavoidable given the limited information available about the climate of the Great Plains and appropriate agricultural techniques and farm sizes for a semi-arid region. Had homesteaders better understood the weather they might not have accepted the claims of a changing climate or of dryfarming doctrine. And had dryfarming tests occurred under less favorable circumstances, its doctrine might have been more circumspect, with less encouragement for small farmers. 1900 1903 1906 1909 1912 1915 1918 1921 1924 1927 1930 1901 1904 1907 1910 1913 1916 1919 1922 1925 Eastern Montana
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Mean minus one stdev. 34 (1895-1929) Notes: Montana wheat yields relative to the annual wheat yields in Ohio give similar results. Total available federal land is in terms of 1,000 acres. Real wheat prices are calculated using nominal prices and the consumer price index (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1976, Historical Statistics, 211 49. As we have indicated, soil quality in the upper Great Plains was generally high (Hargreaves, 1957, 6; Wilson, 1923, 8-10 Seamans (1921) , , and Clawson, Saunderson, and Johnson (1940) .
53. See Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982, 11) for discussion of the "availability" heuristic. Basically, individuals assess the probability of an event by the ease in which previous instances can be brought to mind. Past experiences or information are relied upon in decision making, especially if they have credibility. El-Gamal and Grether (1995) also discuss undue reliance on past information as "conservatism"whereby decision makers require more evidence to update their priors than the Bayesian rule would imply.
